Project Planning Checklist

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Every accepted correction to this page is recorded with the exact change, so readers can see how the page improved over time.

1. 30 July 2026 · corrected by Emir Baycan

   Corrected six issues spanning research citations and case studies, most seriously a Heathrow Terminal 5 case study that inverted the real outcome (claiming a cost overrun when the project was actually delivered on budget) alongside an unverified supporting study, and a Mik Kersten citation that inverted his actual thesis.

   What the page claimed

   Article included an unverified '33 percent schedule overrun' figure alongside Bent Flyvbjerg's otherwise-accurate real research. It misattributed planning-fallacy co-author Michael Ross to the University of British Columbia, when he was actually at the University of Waterloo. It included an unverified statistics ('150 projects,' '40 percent,' '52 percent') attributed to Mik Kersten's real 2018 book, and more seriously, framed his work as advocating more formal phase gates, when his actual thesis argues against traditional phase-gate planning in favor of continuous flow-based delivery - essentially inverting his real argument. It included an unverified specific ' billion tourism value, 59-to-1 return' statistic for the Sydney Opera House with no real source. It cited an entirely unverified source ('Caleb Racicot, University of Denver') for the real Denver International Airport baggage system case study, along with unverified specific cost and requirements-expansion figures. And most seriously, it described Heathrow Terminal 5 as having a substantial cost overrun ('.6 billion against an original estimate of .6 billion'), when Terminal 5 was actually delivered on budget (~£4.3 billion) and on schedule - the opposite of what the article claimed - while also citing an entirely unverified 'Sadie Lowndes group' study with unverified 23%/40% statistics.

   What was corrected

   The unverified Flyvbjerg schedule-overrun figure was removed, keeping only the verified 62% cost-overrun statistic. Ross's affiliation corrected to the University of Waterloo. The Kersten passage rewritten to accurately describe his real Flow Framework and his actual argument against traditional phase-gate planning, rather than fabricating statistics that supported the opposite conclusion. The Sydney Opera House statistic replaced with an accurate, appropriately-hedged general statement. The Denver case study's unverified source was removed, with unverified specific figures softened to accurate qualitative descriptions. The Heathrow Terminal 5 passage was corrected to accurately state it was delivered on budget and on schedule, with the unverified 'Sadie Lowndes group' study removed and replaced with an accurate general statement about the real, credited role of the integrated project insurance model.

   Why: This article contained two of the more serious error types found in this project: a citation (Kersten) that didn't just fabricate statistics but inverted the researcher's actual real-world argument, and a case study (Heathrow T5) that inverted the real historical outcome itself (claiming a cost overrun for a project that was actually delivered on budget). Both required correcting the underlying claim, not just softening an unverified number.

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