Corporate Governance Explained for Non-Experts

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Correction history

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1. 28 July 2026 · corrected by Emir Baycan

   Qualified one overstated claim: the CalPERS Focus List's '23 percentage point' outperformance figure was reframed as an early academic estimate whose size has been debated and appears to have diminished or disappeared in later research once other factors were controlled for. The Danish pension governance-code account (already appropriately described as having 'measurable effects on investment performance' without a specific unverified figure) and the Warren Buffett director-quality quotation were left in place.

   Before

   The article stated CalPERS Focus List companies that adopted reforms beat unresponsive companies by about 23 percentage points, presented as a settled fact.

   After

   Reframed the figure as an early academic estimate whose magnitude has been contested and appears to have weakened in later research.

   Why: The CalPERS Focus List effect-size literature is genuinely mixed, with later studies finding smaller or no lasting effect after controls. Correction adds that debate rather than presenting one estimate as settled.

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Full contribution timeline

1. Correction 28 July 2026

   Emir Baycan: Qualified one overstated claim: the CalPERS Focus List's '23 percentage point' outperformance figure was reframed as an early academic estimate whose size has been debated and appears to have diminished or disappeared in later research once other factors were controlled for. The Danish pension governance-code account (already appropriately described as having 'measurable effects on investment performance' without a specific unverified figure) and the Warren Buffett director-quality quotation were left in place.

   Proof record →