Correction: Game Theory Applications: Navigating Strategic Decisions (2)
Corrected by Emir Baycan · Full-Stack Developer, Mobile App Builder and Web Platform Founder with expertise in SEO, automation, SaaS, AI visibility, DevOps and scalable digital products
Emir Baycan found something wrong, outdated, or unsupported on this page and proposed a fix. The publisher accepted the correction.
- Role
- Correction
- Publisher
- When Notes Fly
- Topic
- Concepts
- Status
- Accepted
- Date
- 28 July 2026
The exact change
The article stated that neither Flood-Dresher player cooperated, that every finite game has a Nash equilibrium (without the mixed-strategy condition), that Dawkins/Maynard Smith/Price showed ESS in 1973, that Nash bargaining predicts a proportional surplus split, that Harsanyi developed trembling-hand perfection, and that Henrich et al. studied dozens of cultures establishing regular rejection below 20-30%.
Corrected each to the established record: repeated-game cooperation in Flood-Dresher; mixed-strategy condition on Nash existence; Maynard Smith and Price for the 1973 ESS paper with Dawkins as later populariser; product-maximization for Nash bargaining; Selten for trembling-hand perfection; and fifteen small-scale societies with substantial variation for Henrich et al. 2001.
Suggested change
See before/after.
Why this is better
These are verifiable errors of historical result, mathematical characterization, authorship, and study scope, corrected against the primary literature rather than by substituting new unverified sources.
How this record is verified
- The contribution is tied to a real, identified contributor, not an anonymous byline.
- It counts only because the publisher, When Notes Fly, accepted it. Self-claimed work earns nothing.
- It is recorded against a specific page and cannot be bought or edited after the fact.